Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Provision of public goods in a federal economy: The role of party politics

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sengupta, Bodhisattva

Abstract

We analyze the role of political parties in the provision of public goods within a federal economy. The public goods are federally funded but locally produced (with costly local revenues), and have interjurisdictional spillover effects. The direction and magnitude of fund flow, which ultimately determine the local provision of public goods, are influenced by the re-election probability of the parties in power at the federal and provincial levels. The prevailing wisdom is that provincial governments, which are ruled by the same political party as that ruling at the federal level, enjoy a higher level of federal transfers. We demonstrate that there exists incentive effect of federal transfer complementing such partisan effects.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-501FPD5-1/2/4ca58b953cd43849f13d0655aa65fc13
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 104-119

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:1:p:104-119

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords: Federalism Party politics Local taxation;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
  2. J�nos Kornai & Eric Maskin & G�rard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
  3. Kevin Milligan & Michael Smart, 2005. "Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 1453, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Feld, Lars P., 2009. "Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized governments?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 115-123, March.
  5. Sebastian G. Kessing, 2007. "Strategic Complementarity in the Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 699-710, 08.
  6. Johansson, Eva, 2003. "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 883-915, May.
  7. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
  8. Hindricks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
  10. Zhuravskaya Ekatherina, 2000. "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style," EERC Working Paper Series 99-15e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  11. Kothenburger, Marko, 2007. "Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.
  12. Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
  13. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May.
  14. Khemani, Stuti, 2003. "Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3016, The World Bank.
  15. Robin Boadway, 2001. "Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 93-121, June.
  16. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  17. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
  18. Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:1:p:104-119. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.