The median juror and the trial of Socrates
AbstractA model of the mechanism used by the Classical Athenians to prosecute Socrates is presented. Two important features of such trials are, first, both the prosecutor and the defendant propose sanctions and, second, a jury takes a simple majority vote over the two proposals. The Classical Athenians created a mechanism to achieve a median-juror result. This sanction is a Condorcet Winner among all possible sanctions, responds to both the harm of the act and the uncertainty of guilt, and, under reasonable conditions, improves deterrence resulting in fewer crimes being committed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Deterrence Jury decision making Median juror Sanction Socrates;
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