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The conservative central banker revisited: Too conservative is more costly than too liberal

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Author Info
Tillmann, Peter
Abstract

A conservative central banker, who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than the social planner, solves the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy. This note shows that the welfare costs of deviating from the optimal degree of monetary conservatism are asymmetric. A too conservative central banker is more costly than a too liberal central banker.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-4TJ1HF2-1/2/ff1f8256dbaa86766848e898df2b8315
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 24 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 737-741
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:737-741

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy Delegation Conservative central bank Stabilization bias;

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

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