Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach
AbstractFormal standards arise out of deliberations of standards-writing organizations, while de facto standards result from unfettered market processes. Therefore, the formers are of a higher quality and legitimacy, but are slower to develop than the latters. To address this trade-off, we analyze a dynamic game where two players choose between one evolving formal standard and one mature de facto standard. The outcome of the game relies on the coordination mechanism used by the players, on the relative value they attach to successful coordination, and on the formal standard's performance at the end of the game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Other versions of this item:
- Paul Belleflamme, 2000. "Coordination on Formal vs. de facto Standards: A Dynamic Approach," Working Papers 412, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
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