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Quantal response models in step-level public good games

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Author Info
Offerman, Theo
Schram, Arthur
Sonnemans, Joep

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-3T0TFR6-5/2/a35f86a8e52e26db52e7dca90d09e9b6
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 89-100
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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:89-100

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. JIMENEZ Edward, 2002. "Unified Game Theory," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 25, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Suren Basov, 2002. "Bounded Rationality: Static versus Dynamic Approach," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 864, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  3. Suren Basov & Liam Blanckenberg & Lata Gangadharan, 2007. "Behavioural Anomalies, Bounded Rationality and Simple Heuristics," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1012, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers' Dilemma," Virginia Economics Online Papers 328, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2007. "Hierarchical Parametric Models for Social Dilemma Games," Working Papers 07-013, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Simon P Anderson & Jacob K Goeree & Charles A Holt, 2001. "A Thoeretical Anlysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000075, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 1999. "Altruism and Noisy Behavior in One-Shot Public Goods Experiments," Virginia Economics Online Papers 331, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Suren Basov, 2003. "Bounded Rationality:Static Versus Dynamic Approaches," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 874, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  10. Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Suren Basov, 2003. "Quantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities: A Dynamic Approach," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 880, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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