Evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network
AbstractIn some real complex systems the structures are difficult to map or changing over time. To explore the evolution of strategies on these complex systems, it is not realistic enough to specify their structures or topological properties in advance. In this paper, we address the evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network adopting the prisoner’s dilemma game. We introduce a growing rate q to control the ratio of network growth to strategy evolution. A large q denotes that the network grows faster than strategy evolution. Simulation results show that a fast growing rate is helpful to promote the average payoffs of both cooperators and defectors. Moreover, this parameter also significantly influences the cooperation frequency on the resulting networks. The coexisting mechanisms in this paper may provide a beneficial insight for understanding the emergence of complex topological structures and game behaviors in numerous real systems.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.
Volume (Year): 391 (2012)
Issue (Month): 24 ()
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Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/
Stochastic growth model; Evolutionary game; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Topological property; Game behavior;
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- Fu, Feng & Chen, Xiaojie & Liu, Lianghuan & Wang, Long, 2007. "Promotion of cooperation induced by the interplay between structure and game dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 383(2), pages 651-659.
- Qin, Shao-Meng & Zhang, Guo-Yong & Chen, Yong, 2009. "Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 388(23), pages 4893-4900.
- Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaž & Danku, Zsuzsa, 2008. "Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(8), pages 2075-2082.
- Wu, Zhi-Xi & Guan, Jian-Yue & Xu, Xin-Jian & Wang, Ying-Hai, 2007. "Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on Barabási–Albert scale-free networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 379(2), pages 672-680.
- A. Szolnoki & M. Perc, 2009. "Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules," The European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 337-344, February.
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