Fragmentation versus stability in bimodal coalitions
AbstractCompeting bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It accounts for local versus global alignment with respect to the joining of a coalition. The existence of two competing world coalitions is found to yield one unique stable distribution of actors. On the opposite a unique world leadership allows the emergence of unstable relationships. In parallel to regular actors which have a clear coalition choice, “neutral”, “frustrated” and “risky” actors are produced. The cold war organisation after world war II is shown to be rather stable. The emergence of a fragmentation process from eastern group disappearance is explained as well as continuing western group stability. Some hints are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships. European construction is analyzed with respect to European stability. Chinese stability is also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.
Volume (Year): 230 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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