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Unsecured debt with public insurance: From bad to worse

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  • Athreya, Kartik B.
  • Simpson, Nicole B.

Abstract

In U.S. data, income interruptions, the receipt of public insurance, and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related. The central contribution of this paper is to evaluate both bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other. Specifically, we explicitly allow for distortion created by the default option and public insurance to affect 1) risk-taking, 2) borrowing, and 3) search effort. Our analysis delivers two striking conclusions. First, we find that U.S. personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier to allowing the public insurance system to improve welfare. Second, contrary to popular belief, we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more, not less, bankruptcy.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 53 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 797-825

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:4:p:797-825

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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Cited by:
  1. Jonathan Halket, 2012. "Existence of an equilibrium in incomplete markets with discrete choices and many markets," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 711, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  2. Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Kartik Athreya & Ahmet Akyol, 2007. "Unsecured Credit and Self-Employment," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Song Han & Geng Li, 2011. "Household Borrowing after Personal Bankruptcy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 491-517, 03.
  5. Ionescu, Felicia, 2009. "Risky College Investment under Alternative Bankruptcy Regimes for Student Loans," Working Papers 2009-01, Department of Economics, Colgate University.
  6. Xavier Mateos-Planas, 2011. "Credit Lines," 2011 Meeting Papers 1293, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Kyle F. Herkenhoff, 2012. "Informal unemployment insurance and labor market dynamics," Working Papers 2012-057, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  8. Mateos-Planas, Xavier, 2009. "A model of credit limits and bankruptcy with applications to welfare and indebtedness," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0910, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  9. Mankart, Jochen & Rodano, Giacomo, 2012. "Bankruptcy Law, Debt Portfolios, and Entrepreneurship," Economics Working Paper Series 1216, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

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