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An economic rationale for public education: The value of commitment

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  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

This paper offers an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of uniform public schooling, which is viewed here as a way for the government to precommit itself to restraints on future income redistribution. Such precommitment is likely to enhance accumulation of human capital, to bolster economic growth, and, under certain circumstances, to constitu te a preferred choice for a majority of voters.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 463-474

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:45:y:2000:i:2:p:463-474

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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References

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  1. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1988. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic," UCLA Economics Working Papers 532, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
  3. Lott, John R, Jr, 1990. "An Explanation for Public Provision of Schooling: The Importance of Indoctrination," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 199-231, April.
  4. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
  5. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
  6. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans," Staff Report 122, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  7. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, April.
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  9. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
  10. Solon, Gary, 1992. "Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 393-408, June.
  11. Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 46-57, March.
  12. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
  13. Shantayanan Devarajan & Danyang Xie & Heng-fu Zou, 1999. "Should Public Capital Be Subsidized or Provided?," CEMA Working Papers 75, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August.
  3. Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Financing public education: a political economy model with altruistic agents and retirement concerns," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Nikos Benos, 2004. "Education Policies and Economic Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  5. Nikos Benos, 2005. "Education Systems, Growth and Welfare," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2005, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  6. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, 2005. "A Case for Taxing Education," CESifo Working Paper Series 1440, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2000. "Human capital, social capital, and public schooling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 879-890, May.
  8. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series 538, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Thum, Claudio & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2003. "Mobility and the Role of Education as a Commitment Device," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(5), pages 549-64, September.
  10. Nikos Benos, 2005. "Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from OECD," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 1-2005, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  11. Gradstein, Mark, 2010. "Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7838, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Soares, Jorge, 2003. "Self-interest and public funding of education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 703-727, March.
  13. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, 2008. "A case for taxing education," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 145-163, April.

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