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Monetary politics and unemployment persistence

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  • Jonsson, Gunnar
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

    Volume (Year): 39 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 303-325

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:39:y:1997:i:2:p:303-325

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    2. Cohen, Gerald & Alesina, Alberto & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," Scholarly Articles 4553023, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-45, May.
    5. Alogoskoufis, George & Lockwood, Ben & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 1992. "Wage Inflation, Electoral Uncertainty and the Exchange Rate Regime: Theory and UK Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract?," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 94-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    7. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1987. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," NBER Working Papers 1950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
    10. Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    11. Alesina, Alberto F & Cohen, Gerald D & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. G Milesi-Feretti, 1991. "Do Good or Do Well? Public Debt Management in a Two-Party Economy," CEP Discussion Papers dp0053, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    13. Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    14. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 1989. "The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026262074x, December.
    15. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    16. Alesina, Alberto & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 663-88, October.
    17. Alberto Alesina & Gerald D. Cohen & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy And Elections In Oecd Democracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, 03.
    18. Jonsson, G., 1995. "Monetary Politics and Unemployment Persistence," Papers 593, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    19. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    20. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Spolaore, Enrico, 1994. "How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-140, September.
    21. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1995. "The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1381-1402, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Svensson, Lars E O & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Implementing Optimal Policy Through Inflation-Forecast Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 317-342, December.
    3. Roc Armenter & Martin Bodenstein, 2006. "Of nutters and doves," International Finance Discussion Papers 885, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 263/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    5. Caleiro, António, 2009. "How upside down are political business cycles when there is output persistence," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 22-26, March.
    6. Belbute, José & Caleiro, António, 2009. "Measuring the Persistence on Consumption in Portugal," MPRA Paper 15116, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Henrik Jensen, . "Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. Frey, Rainer, 2009. "The design of an asymmetric currency union with shock persistence and spillovers: Short-term versus medium-term," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 85-97, March.
    9. Jón Steinsson, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy in an economy with inflation persistence," Economics wp11, Department of Economics, Central bank of Iceland.
    10. Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    11. Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J.M., 1998. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Faust, Jon & Irons, John S., 1999. "Money, politics and the post-war business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 61-89, February.
    13. Sujit Kapadia, 2005. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Hysteresis," Economics Series Working Papers 250, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Song, Zheng, 2008. "Persistent Ideology and the Determination of Public Policies over Time," MPRA Paper 10364, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Altavilla, Carlo & Ciccarelli, Matteo, 2010. "Evaluating the effect of monetary policy on unemployment with alternative inflation forecasts," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 237-253, January.
    16. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. " Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-95, September.
    17. Belbute, José & Caleiro, António, 2010. "Cross Country Evidence on Consumption Persistence," MPRA Paper 22008, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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