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A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees

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Author Info

  • Darmann, Andreas
  • Klamler, Christian
  • Pferschy, Ulrich

Abstract

A fair spanning tree of a graph maximizes the minimum satisfaction among individuals given their preferences over the edges of the graph. In this note we answer an open question about the computational complexity of determining fair spanning trees raised in Darmann et al. (2009). It is shown that the maximin voter satisfaction problem under choose-t elections is -complete for each fixed t>=2.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-4YYXJHN-1/2/c0d7f92873ac3d92f0ed94b328cca86d
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 82-85

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:1:p:82-85

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

Related research

Keywords: Minimal spanning tree Social choice Fairness;

References

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  1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Cost Monotonicity, Consistency And Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 629, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Darmann, Andreas & Klamler, Christian & Pferschy, Ulrich, 2009. "Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 238-250, September.
  3. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
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Cited by:
  1. Klamler, Christian & Pferschy, Ulrich & Ruzika, Stefan, 2012. "Committee selection under weight constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 48-56.
  2. Darmann, Andreas, 2013. "How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 282-292.
  3. Andreas Darmann & Christian Klamler & Ulrich Pferschy, 2011. "Finding socially best spanning trees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 511-527, April.

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