Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation
AbstractDrissi-Bakhkhat and Truchon ["Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabilities," Social Choice and Welfare, 23, (2004), 161-185.] extend the Condorcet-Kemeny-Young maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation by relaxing the assumption that the probability of correctly ordering two alternatives is the same for all pairs of alternatives. They let this probability increase with the distance between the two alternatives in the true order, to reflect the intuition that a judge or voter is more prone to errors when confronted to two comparable alternatives than when confronted to a good alternative and a bad one. In this note, it is shown than, for a suitably chosen probability function, the maximum likelihood rule coincides with the Borda rule, thus, partially reconciling the Borda and the Condorcet methods.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Truchon, 2006. "Borda and the Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation," Cahiers de recherche 0623, CIRPEE.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
- Mohamed Drissi-Bakhkhat & Michel Truchon, 2004.
"Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 161-185, October.
- Drissi, Mohamed & Truchon, Michel, 2002. "Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0211, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Michel Truchon, 2004.
"Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Mathias Risse, 2005. "Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 95-113, October.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013.
"Voting rules as statistical estimators,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Conitzer, Vincent, 2012. "Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 100-102.
- Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.
- Truchon, Michel & Gordon, Stephen, 2009.
"Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 199-212, March.
- Michel Truchon & Stephen Gordon, 2006. "Statistical Comparison of Aggregation Rules for Votes," Cahiers de recherche 0625, CIRPEE.
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2011. "Borda voting is non-manipulable but cloning manipulation is possible," MPRA Paper 50848, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jan 2012.
- T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2014. "Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 331-357, March.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.