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Super weak isomorphism of extensive games

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  • Casajus, Andre

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  • Casajus, Andre, 2006. "Super weak isomorphism of extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 107-116, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:51:y:2006:i:1:p:107-116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    3. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    5. Casajus, Andre, 2003. "Weak isomorphism of extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 267-290, December.
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