Farsighted stability in average return games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 44 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
- Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
- Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
- Ryo Kawasaki & Takashi Sato & Shigeo Muto, 2012. "Farsighted Stable Sets of Tariff Games," Tohoku Economics Research Group 281, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Faculty of Economics, Tohoku University.
- A Bhattacharya, . "Stable and Efficient Networks with Farsighted Players: the Largest Consistent Set," Discussion Papers 09/34, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe, 2008.
"Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 303-313, November.
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