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Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function

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  • Cardona-Coll, Daniel

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  • Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:33:y:1997:i:2:p:101-113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1980. "Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 249-269, December.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    3. Sotskov, Alexander, 1994. "Vetoing in social choice with blockings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 203-216, April.
    4. Mueller, Dennis C., 1978. "Voting by veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-75, August.
    5. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    6. Hervé Moulin, 1981. "The Proportional Veto Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(3), pages 407-416.
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