IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v53y2014icp106-110.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations

Author

Listed:
  • Flanagan, Francis X.

Abstract

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable allocations is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Flanagan, Francis X., 2014. "The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 106-110.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:106-110
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406814000858
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alvin E. Roth, 1985. "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 379-389, August.
    2. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
    3. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    4. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1189-1194, June.
    5. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    6. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2000. "On a characterization of stable matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 43-49, July.
    7. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
    8. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
    9. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2013. "Vacancies in supply chain networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 354-357.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    2. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
    3. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    4. Toyotaka Sakai, 2011. "A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 337-342, December.
    5. Bando, Keisuke, 2014. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 173-181.
    6. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    7. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    8. Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E., 2018. "The lattice of envy-free matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 201-211.
    9. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020. "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.
    10. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
    11. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2015. "Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 552-573.
    12. Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang, 2017. "The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-55.
    13. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    14. Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao, 2017. "Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 56-68.
    15. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2014. "Cumulative offer process is order-independent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 37-40.
    16. Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    17. Hatfield, John William & Immorlica, Nicole & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2012. "Testing substitutability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 639-645.
    18. Flanagan, Francis X., 2014. "Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 113-117.
    19. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    20. Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2020. "The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 305-318.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:106-110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.