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The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

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  • Dogan, Onur
  • Laffond, Gilbert
  • Lainé, Jean

Abstract

Abstract We extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of Core allocations. This result also holds in the case where the set of agents is partitioned into non-empty coalitions with any size, as well as for the class of markets studied in Konishi et al. (2001), where individuals exchange several types of purely indivisible goods.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 60-67

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:60-67

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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Keywords: Joint preferences Couples Core Indivisible goods;

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  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:45:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2007. "Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 175-184, November.
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Bird, Charles G., 1984. "Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 309-313.
  5. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  7. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
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