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A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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  • Hu, Cheng-Cheng
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    Abstract

    We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 5 (September)
    Pages: 884-892

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:884-892

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

    Related research

    Keywords: Mas-Colell bargaining set Nash program Subgame perfect equilibrium;

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    1. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    2. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Working Papers 2001-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Ron Holzman, 2001. "The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 543-553.
    5. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
    6. Ezra Einy & David Wettstein, 1999. "A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 219-230.
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