A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
AbstractWe propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Mas-Colell bargaining set Nash program Subgame perfect equilibrium;
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