Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
AbstractThe paper contributes to the perfect Bayesian implementation problem when the planner selects an outcome after agents send a signal profile. In our problem, the planner always selects the outcomes that maximize her expected utility, given her posterior belief about the state. The paper explicitly models the problem and shows a full characterization of SCF set that can be perfect Bayesian implemented in FGP equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Social choice function Perfect Bayesian implementation FGP equilibrium Bayesian reliable objection;
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- Luis Corchón & Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 1995.
"The Theory Of Implementation When The Planner Is A Player,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1995-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
- Baliga, S. & Corchon, L.C. & Sjostrom, T., 1995. "The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9512, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1751, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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