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Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

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  • Gürtler, Oliver
  • Münster, Johannes

Abstract

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, is sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if all players start off at the same position, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 179-190

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:179-190

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Dynamic tournaments Contests Sabotage Heterogeneity;

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References

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  1. Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2009. "Sabotage in dynamic tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2009-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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  7. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Rational self-sabotage," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 1-4.
  2. Alasdair Brown & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 062, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  3. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: An Overview," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4422, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Sabotage in dynamic tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 179-190, March.
  5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oliver Gurtler, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 051, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  6. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "Productive versus destructive efforts in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 461-468.
  7. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2013. "The optimality of heterogeneous tournaments," Working Papers, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance IF42V1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.

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