May's theorem in an infinite setting
AbstractWe generalize May's theorem to an infinite setting, preserving the elementary character of the original theorem. We define voting scenarios and generalized voting scenarios, and prove appropriate versions of May's theorem. The case of generalized voting scenarios specialized to a countably infinite set of voters and the collections of all coalitions that have asymptotic density, shows that majority rule is the only aggregation rule that satisfies neutrality, irrelevance of null coalitions, anonymity, and positive responsiveness.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Voting scenario Preference profile Aggregation rule Majority rule Countably many voters;
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- Lauwers, Luc, 1998. "Intertemporal objective functions: Strong pareto versus anonymity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 37-55, January.
- Mark Fey, 2004. "May’s Theorem with an infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 275-293, October.
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