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Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

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  • Zhou, Yong-Hui
  • Yu, Jian
  • Xiang, Shu-Wen
  • Wang, Long

Abstract

We prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules form a dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore, we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 233-240

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:3-4:p:233-240

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Nash equilibrium Game with endogenous sharing rules Essential stability Upper hemicontinuous Residual set;

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  1. Yong-Hui Zhou & Jian Yu & Shu-Wen Xiang, 2007. "Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 493-503, April.
  2. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-72, July.
  3. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41, January.
  4. Al-Najjar, Nabil, 1995. "Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 151-164, April.
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