Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules
AbstractWe prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules form a dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore, we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 45 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Nash equilibrium Game with endogenous sharing rules Essential stability Upper hemicontinuous Residual set;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yong-Hui Zhou & Jian Yu & Shu-Wen Xiang, 2007. "Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 493-503, April.
- Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990.
"Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-72, July.
- Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987. "Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
- Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41, January.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil, 1995. "Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 151-164, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.