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Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets

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  • Zimper, Alexander

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (September)
Pages: 729-751

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:6:p:729-751

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Guesnerie, R., 1999. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," DELTA Working Papers 1999-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. GHIRARDATO, Paolo & LE BRETON, Michel, . "Choquet rationality," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1447, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
  5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  6. Borgers, Tilman, 1993. "Pure Strategy Dominance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 423-30, March.
  7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  8. Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
  9. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  10. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 187-191, October.
  11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2012. "Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 337-353.

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