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Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods

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  • Papai, Szilvia

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2003)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
Pages: 931-959

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:8:p:931-959

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
  2. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
  3. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
  4. Bird, Charles G., 1984. "Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 309-313.
  5. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  6. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  7. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  8. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
  9. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  10. Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2002. "Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 347-361, February.
  11. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439.
  12. Bettina Klaus & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 421-435.
  13. Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
  14. Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-70, May.
  15. Quint, Thomas, 1997. "Restricted houseswapping games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 451-470, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Wako, Jun, 2005. "Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 179-199, March.
  3. Papai, Szilvia, 2007. "Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 208-235, January.
  4. Quesada, Antonio, 2006. "Hierarchical allocation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 98-103, April.

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