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Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints

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  • Lambson, Val Eugene

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-22

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:1-22

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  2. Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-22, February.
  3. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  4. Lambson Val Eugene, 1994. "Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 444-468, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011. "Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.
  2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  3. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2006. "The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 116-121, January.
  4. Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Towards a Theory of Competition Policy," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 121, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Lambson, Val E., 1999. "A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-46, October.
  6. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  7. Ishibashi, Ikuo, 2008. "Collusive price leadership with capacity constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 704-715, May.
  8. L. Lambertini & D. Sasaki, 1999. "A Cost-side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna 355, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  9. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  10. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  11. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock, 2011. "Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 29-74, May.
  12. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2006. "Optimal punishments with detection lags," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-201, August.
  13. Lambertini, Luca & Sasaki, Dan, 2001. "Marginal costs and collusive sustainability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 117-120, July.

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