AbstractTechnological change is examined in a model of capital production to show that “creative destruction” can occur as an outcome of firm's optimizing behaviour, regardless of market structure. Capital systems are made up of components that are all necessary for each system to operate and each component has uncertainty with respect to its durability. For different types of technological change agents make a corresponding decision about whether to continue to use the original capital system (if it is still alive) or to scrap it and build a new capital system which embodies the new technology. Each system has transitional probabilities for scrapping that depend on the size of the present value of the vintage. As technology improves, the optimizing level of durability, and thus the optimal stock of embodied services increases for the new capital system. Yet simultaneously the probability of scrapping an old system over any given time interval increases. Thus, the larger is the improvement in technology, the greater is the chance of scrapping the old system before its physical service life has ended. Over some time horizon of unforeseen and rapid technological change investment in new capital systems could be increasing while at the same time old capital systems are scrapped at a faster rate.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM).
Volume (Year): 69 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/mathematics-and-computers-in-simulation/
Optimal obsolescence; Technological change; Returns to scale;
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