The concept of self-governance of fisheries resources has implicitly assumed that self-governance would be democratic in structure. This concept of self-governance is a patterned on the democratic governance of cooperatives. The present analysis argues for a corporate concept of fisheries self-governance. A corporate governance structure provides a vehicle for effective joint decision-making by producers, but avoids the inefficient longrun incentives created by a cooperative governance structure.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 19 (1995) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 39-45 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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