On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world: Evidence from differential enforcement
AbstractThis paper analyzes the causal effect between strict employment protection regulations and the firm incentive to invest in job training of their employees. We explore a large firm level data set across several developing countries and assume that the rigidity of labor regulations affects more the investment decision of firms that faces a rigid enforcement of labor regulations. Our findings show that differences across countries in the enforcement of more rigid employment protection regulation are associated with very small differences in the investment in job training across firms. This finding is robust across several specifications and samples.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): S1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco
On-the-job training; Employment protection; Enforcement regulations; Firm level data;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
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- Gindling, T. H. & Mossaad, Nadwa & Trejos, Juan Diego, 2014. "The Consequences of Increased Enforcement of Legal Minimum Wages in a Developing Country: An Evaluation of the Impact of the Campaña Nacional de Salarios Mínimos in Costa Rica," IZA Discussion Papers 8253, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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