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Mixing the princes and the paupers: Pay and performance in the National Basketball Association

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Author Info

  • Simmons, Rob
  • Berri, David J.

Abstract

We investigate how team and individual performances of players in the National Basketball Association respond to variations in intra-team pay inequality. By breaking down team dispersion into conditional and expected components, we find that expected pay dispersion has a positive effect on team and individual performance. We find that team and individual performances are essentially orthogonal to conditional pay inequality, counter to the hypotheses of fairness and cohesion proposed in the literature both for sports and general occupations. A change in collective bargaining regime in 1996 had little impact on either team or player productivity.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 381-388

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Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:18:y:2011:i:3:p:381-388

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco

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Keywords: Pay inequality Productivity Basketball;

References

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  7. Eric D. Gould & Eyal Winter, 2009. "Interactions between Workers and the Technology of Production: Evidence from Professional Baseball," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 188-200, February.
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  9. Grund, Christian & Westergård-Nielsen, Niels C., 2004. "The Dispersion of Employees’ Wage Increases and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 1402, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  13. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
  14. Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Peers at Work," NBER Working Papers 12508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  16. Thierry Lallemand & Robert Plasman & François Rycx, 2004. "Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 533-558, November.
  17. Anthony C. Krautmann & Peter von Allmen & David Berri, 2009. "The Underpayment of Restricted Players in North American Sports Leagues," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 4(3), pages 161-175, August.
  18. Paul Sommers, 1998. "Work incentives and salary distributions in the national hockey league," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(1), pages 119-119, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Leif Brandes & Marc Brechot & Egon Franck, 2011. "The Temptation of Social Ties: When Interpersonal Network Transactions Hurt Firm Performance," Working Papers 00159, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised 2012.
  2. Le Maux, Benoit & Rocaboy, Yvon, 2012. "A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 491-493.
  3. Ruxanda Berlinschi & Jeroen Schokkaert & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2010. "When Drains and Gains Coincide: Migration and International Football Performance," LICOS Discussion Papers 26510, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  4. Giacomo De Luca & Jeroen Schokkaert & Jo Swinnen, 2011. "Cultural Differences, Assimilation and Behavior: Player Nationality and Penalties in Football," LICOS Discussion Papers 29711, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  5. Robert Breunig & Bronwyn Garrett-Rumba & Mathieu Jardin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2014. "Wage dispersion and team performance: a theoretical model and evidence from baseball," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(3), pages 271-281, January.

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