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Unity suggests strength: an experimental study of decentralized and collective bargaining

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried
  • Guth, Werner
  • Keser, Claudia

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried & Guth, Werner & Keser, Claudia, 2003. "Unity suggests strength: an experimental study of decentralized and collective bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 465-479, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:10:y:2003:i:4:p:465-479
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    5. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    6. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    7. Byoung Heon Jun, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76.
    8. Keser, Claudia & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 1999. "Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-20, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cardoso, Ana Rute & Portugal, Pedro, 2003. "Bargained Wages, Wage Drift and the Design of the Wage Setting System," IZA Discussion Papers 914, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    3. Ana Rute Cardoso & Pedro Portugal, 2005. "Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under Different Bargaining Settings," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 875-902, October.
    4. Hong-Ren Din & Chia-Hung Sun, 2023. "Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 73-94, January.

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