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Competition and access pricing in the UK water industry

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  • Hern, R.

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  • Hern, R., 2001. "Competition and access pricing in the UK water industry," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 117-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:10:y:2001:i:3-4:p:117-127
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baumol, William J, 1996. "Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 49-72, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reto Foellmi & Urs Meister, 2012. "Enhancing the Efficiency of Water Supply—Product Market Competition Versus Trade," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 299-324, September.
    2. Grout, Paul A., 2001. "Competition law in telecommunications and its implications for common carriage of water," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 137-149.
    3. Balazs Egert, 2009. "Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Independence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2642, CESifo.

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