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State government cash and in-kind benefits: Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and cross-program substitution

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  • Marton, James
  • Wildasin, David E.

Abstract

US states provide both cash and health insurance benefits for the poor, partially financed by fiscal transfers from the Federal government. The 1996 welfare reform drastically reduces Federal support for cash transfers at the margin, lowering the relative price to states of providing benefits to the poor through Medicaid. This paper analyzes the comparative-statics response of state governments to such changes in intergovernmental transfers, showing (in central cases) that they can contribute not only to reductions in state expenditures on cash benefits but to increases in expenditures on Medicaid, whether or not beneficiary populations are mobile among states. Length: 27 pages
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  • Marton, James & Wildasin, David E., 2007. "State government cash and in-kind benefits: Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and cross-program substitution," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-20, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:61:y:2007:i:1:p:1-20
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    Cited by:

    1. David E. Wildasin, 2021. "Open-Economy Public Finance," National Tax Journal, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(2), pages 467-490.
    2. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Ouattara, Bazoumanna & Strobl, Eric, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," MPRA Paper 3158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2007.
    3. Leung, Pauline, 2022. "State responses to federal matching grants: The case of medicaid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    4. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1865, CESifo.
    5. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2005. "A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Working Papers 2006-04, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    6. Luis Ayala & Ana Herrero & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2019. "Welfare Benefits in Highly Decentralized Fiscal Systems: Evidence on Interterritorial Mimicking," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1905, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    7. E. Kathleen Adams & Patricia G. Ketsche & Karen J. Minyard, 2015. "Who Really Pays for Medicaid," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(1), pages 4-31, January.
    8. Claire de Oliveira, 2009. "Good Health to All: Reducing Health Inequalities among Children in High- and Low-Income Canadian Families," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 288, May.
    9. Craig, Steven G. & Howard, Larry L., 2014. "Is Medicaid crowding out other state government expenditure? Internal financing and cross-program substitution," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 164-178.
    10. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    11. Wildasin, David E., 2007. "Pre–Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 60(3), pages 649-662, September.
    12. Luis Ayala & Elena Bárcena-Martín & Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, 2022. "Devolution in the U.S. Welfare Reform: Divergence and Degradation in State Benefits," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 20(3), pages 701-726, September.
    13. James Marton, 2007. "The impact of the introduction of premiums into a SCHIP program," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 237-255.
    14. Pauline Leung, 2021. "State Responses to Federal Matching Grants: The Case of Medicaid," Working Papers 647, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    15. J. Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2013. "Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 279-301, August.

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    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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