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The influence of endowments asymmetry and information level on the contribution to a public step good

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  • van Dijk, Eric
  • Grodzka, Malgorzata
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

    Volume (Year): 13 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 329-342

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:13:y:1992:i:2:p:329-342

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

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    Cited by:
    1. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "Inequality and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary 12, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    2. De Cremer, David & Dijk, Eric van, 2009. "Paying for sanctions in social dilemmas: The effects of endowment asymmetry and accountability," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 45-55, May.
    3. Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Patrick Wayland, 2011. "An Experimental Dynamic Public Goods Game with Carryover," Departmental Working Papers, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics 32, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    4. Fung, Jane M.Y. & Au, Wing-tung, 2014. "Effect of inequality on cooperation: Heterogeneity and hegemony in public goods dilemma," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 9-22.
    5. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2003. "Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 0308, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
    6. Gailmard, Sean & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2005. "An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1361-1398, August.
    7. Lightfoot, Geoffrey & Wisniewski, Tomasz, 2014. "Information Asymmetry and Power in a Surveillance Society," MPRA Paper 53109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Urs Fischbacher & Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati, 2011. "Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-059, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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