A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2001. "A model of exchange rate crises with partisan governments," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8394, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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