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A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments

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  • Meon, Pierre-Guillaume

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 23 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 517-535

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:23:y:2001:i:4:p:517-535

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617

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References

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  1. Maurice Obstfeld, 1995. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Garfinkel, M.R. & Glazer, A. & Lee, J., 1997. "Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty," Papers 97-98-15, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  4. Klein, Michael W. & Marion, Nancy P., 1997. "Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 387-404, December.
  5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  8. Ellis, Christopher J. & Thoma, Mark A., 1996. "The implications for an open economy of partisan political business cycles: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 635-651, April.
  9. Bachman, Daniel, 1992. "The effect of political risk on the forward exchange bias: the case of elections," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 208-219, April.
  10. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1989. "Monetary Policy Strategies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 612-632, September.
  11. Lobo, Bento J. & Tufte, David, 1998. "Exchange Rate Volatility: Does Politics Matter?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 351-365, April.
  12. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  13. Edwards, Sebastian, 1996. "Exchange Rates and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Discipline," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 159-63, May.
  14. Gartner, Manfred, 1986. "Some political economy of flexible exchange rates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-168.
  15. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess, 1996. "Politics and exchange rate forecasts," Research Working Paper 96-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  16. Ellis, Christopher J & Thoma, Mark A, 1991. "Partisan Effects in Economies with Variable Electoral Terms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(4), pages 728-41, November.
  17. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  18. Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-45, May.
  19. Alexius, Annika, 1999. "Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 509-523, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Axel Dreher & Stefanie Walter, 2008. "Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF programs on the likelihood and outcome of currency crises," KOF Working papers 08-186, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  2. Cermeño, Rodolfo & Grier, Robin & Grier, Kevin, 2010. "Elections, exchange rates and reform in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 166-174, July.

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