Gifts, Bequests, and Growth
AbstractA familiar result in the theory of private intergenerational transfers is that competitive equilibria with gifts from children to their parents are dynamically inefficient whereas they are dynamically efficient with bequests from parents to their children. This note demonstrates that if growth is endogenous, both gift and bequest economies are dynamically efficient, but gift economies grow more rapidly.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617
Other versions of this item:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmichael, Jeffrey, 1982. "On Barro's Theorem of Debt Neutrality: The Irrelevance of Net Wealth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 202-13, March.
- Andrew B. Abel, 1988.
"Operative Gift and Bequest Motives,"
NBER Working Papers
2331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew B. Abel, . "Operative Gift and Bequest Motives," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 09-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Andrew B. Abel, . "Operative Gift and Bequest Motives," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 9-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Grossman, G.M. & Yanagawa, N., 1992.
"Asset Bubbles and Endogenous Growth,"
160, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Kimball, Miles S., 1987. "Making sense of two-sided altruism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-326, September.
- Paul M Romer, 1999.
"Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2232, David K. Levine.
- O'Connell, Stephen A. & Zeldes, Stephen P., 1993.
"Dynamic efficiency in the gifts economy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 363-379, June.
- King, Ian & Ferguson, Don, 1993. "Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 79-104, August.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992.
"Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1243-59, November.
- Nikos Benos, 2004. "Education Policies and Economic Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Atsue Mizushima & Keiichi Koda, 2007. "Risk Sharing and Growth in the Gifts Economy," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-02, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Berthold U. Wigger, 2002. "Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 53-80, 02.
- Niko Gobbin & Glenn Rayp, 2008. "Different ways of looking at old issues: a time-series approach to inequality and growth," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(7), pages 885-895.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.