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Tenant Turnover, Rental Contracts, and Self-Selection

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  • Miceli, Thomas J.
  • Sirmans, C. F.

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  • Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F., 1999. "Tenant Turnover, Rental Contracts, and Self-Selection," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 301-311, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:8:y:1999:i:4:p:301-311
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J.R. Miron, 1990. "Security of Tenure, Costly Tenants and Rent Regulation," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 27(2), pages 167-183, April.
    2. John D. Benjamin & James D. Shilling & C. F. Sirmans, 1992. "Security Deposits, Adverse Selection and Office Leases," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 259-272, June.
    3. Guasch, J. Luis & Marshall, Robert C., 1987. "A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 291-311, November.
    4. Joanne Salop & Steven C. Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Thomas J. Miceli, 1989. "Housing Rental Contracts and Adverse Selection with an Application to the Rent‐Own Decision," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(4), pages 403-421, December.
    6. Hubert, Franz, 1995. "Contracting with costly tenants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 631-654, October.
    7. David Geltner, 1990. "Return Risk and Cash Flow Risk with Long‐term Riskless Leases in Commercial Real Estate," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 18(4), pages 377-402, December.
    8. John D. Benjamin & Glenn W. Boyle & C. F. Sirmans, 1990. "Retail Leasing: The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 302-312, September.
    9. Allen C. Goodman & Masahiro Kawai, 1985. "Length-of-Residence Discounts and Rental Housing Demand: Theory and Evidence," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(2), pages 93-105.
    10. Joanne Salop & Steven Salop, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 619-627.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Iwata, Shinichiro, 2002. "The Japanese Tenant Protection Law and Asymmetric Information on Tenure Length," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 125-151, June.
    2. Amédée-Manesme, Charles-Olivier & des Rosiers, François & Grégoire, Philippe, 2015. "The pricing of embedded lease options," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 215-220.
    3. Clapham, Eric & Gunnelin, Åke, 2003. "Rental Expectations and the Term Structure of Lease Rates," SIFR Research Report Series 16, Institute for Financial Research.
    4. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    5. Barker, David, 2003. "Length of residence discounts, turnover, and demand elasticity. Should long-term tenants pay less than new tenants?," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, March.
    6. Charles-Olivier Amédée-Manesme & Michel Baroni & Fabrice Barthélémy & Mahdi Mokrane, 2015. "The impact of lease structures on the optimal holding period for a commercial real estate portfolio," Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(2), pages 121-139, March.
    7. Charles-Olivier Amédée-Manesme & Michel Baroni & Fabrice Barthélémy & Mahdi Mokrane, 2015. "The impact of lease structures on the optimal holding period for a commercial real estate portfolio," Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 121-139, March.
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    9. Charles-Olivier Amédée-Manesme & Francois Des Rosiers & Philippe Grégoire, 2017. "Commercial leases, terms and options in the light of game theory," ERES eres2017_175, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    10. Ofer Raz-Dror, 2019. "The Changes In Rent In Israel During The Years Of The Housing Crisis 2008–2015," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 17(1), pages 73-116.
    11. Halket, Jonathan R & Pignatti, Matteo, 2012. "Housing tenure choices with private information," Economics Discussion Papers 8961, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    12. Masatomo Suzuki & Yasushi Asami, 2020. "Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1074-1095, December.
    13. Genesove, David & Hoffmann, Eran & Elster, Yael, 2020. "Agreements Must Be Kept? Residential Leases during Covid-19," CEPR Discussion Papers 15102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Halket, Jonathan & Pignatti Morano di Custoza, Matteo, 2015. "Homeownership and the scarcity of rentals," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 107-123.

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