Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Market share and the illusion of power : Can blue cross force hospitals to discount?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Staten, Michael
  • Dunkelberg, William
  • Umbeck, John
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8K-45F91NB-K/2/66728c5c391c89fb68937fc91e0755ae
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

    Volume (Year): 6 (1987)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 43-58

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:6:y:1987:i:1:p:43-58

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Anil Bamezai & Glenn A. Melnick & Joyce M. Mann & Jack Zwanziger, 2003. "Hospital selective contracting without consumer choice: What can we learn from Medi-Cal?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(1), pages 65-84.
    2. Abe Dunn & Adam Hale Shapiro, 2012. "Physician Market Power and Medical-Care Expenditures," BEA Working Papers 0084, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
    3. Lieke Boonen & Frederik Schut & Bas Donkers & Xander Koolman, 2009. "Which preferred providers are really preferred? Effectiveness of insurers’ channeling incentives on pharmacy choice," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 347-366, December.
    4. Halbersma, R.S. & Mikkers, M.C. & Motchenkova, E. & Seinen, I., 2007. "Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands," Discussion Paper 2007-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    5. Ana Xavier, . "Modelling the Demand for and Supply of Elective Surgery: A Duopoly Model," Discussion Papers 99/38, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Lieke H. H. M. Boonen & Frederik T. Schut & Xander Koolman, 2008. "Consumer channeling by health insurers: natural experiments with preferred providers in the Dutch pharmacy market," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 299-316.
    7. Propper, Carol, 1996. "Market structure and prices: The responses of hospitals in the UK National Health Service to competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 307-335, September.
    8. Ligon, James A., 1997. "The capital structure of hospitals and reimbursement policy," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-77.
    9. Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1988. "Altruism, Rivalry and Crowding-Out in the Nonprofit Firm's Supply of Charity Services: The Case of Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 2753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:6:y:1987:i:1:p:43-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.