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The effect of HMOs on fee-for-service health care expenditures: evidence from medicare revisited

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  • Batata, Amber

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  • Batata, Amber, 2004. "The effect of HMOs on fee-for-service health care expenditures: evidence from medicare revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 951-963, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:23:y:2004:i:5:p:951-963
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    1. repec:mpr:mprres:1182 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
    3. Frank, Richard G. & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Measuring adverse selection in managed health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 829-854, November.
    4. Jonathan Gruber & Phillip Levine & Douglas Staiger, 1999. "Abortion Legalization and Child Living Circumstances: Who is the "Marginal Child"?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 263-291.
    5. Baker, Laurence C., 1997. "The effect of HMOs on fee-for-service health care expenditures: Evidence from Medicare," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 453-481, August.
    6. Roger D. Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd, 1982. "Simulation of a Health Insurance Market with Adverse Selection," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 1027-1042, December.
    7. Laurence C. Baker & Sharmila Shankarkumar, 1998. "Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare, 1990—1994," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 117-152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    9. Cao, Zhun & McGuire, Thomas G., 2003. "Service-level selection by HMOs in Medicare," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 915-931, November.
    10. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    11. Baker Laurence C. & Shankarkumar Sharmila, 1998. "Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare, 1990-1994," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-37, January.
    12. Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845, Elsevier.
    13. Feldman, Roger & Dowd, Bryan, 2000. "Risk segmentation: goal or problem?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 499-512, July.
    14. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    15. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
    16. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Decarolis, Francesco & Guglielmo, Andrea, 2017. "Insurers’ response to selection risk: Evidence from Medicare enrollment reforms," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 383-396.
    2. Leemore Dafny & David Dranove, 2008. "Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't already know? The case of Medicare HMOs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 790-821, September.
    3. Ilyana Kuziemko & Katherine Meckel & Maya Rossin-Slater, 2013. "Do Insurers Risk-Select Against Each Other? Evidence from Medicaid and Implications for Health Reform," NBER Working Papers 19198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Mark Braverman & Sylvain Chassang, 2016. "Data-Driven Incentive Alignment in Capitation Schemes," Working Papers 073_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    5. Naoki Aizawa & You Suk Kim, 2015. "Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Jason Brown & Mark Duggan & Ilyana Kuziemko & William Woolston, 2014. "How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3335-3364, October.
    7. Kurt Lavetti & Kosali Simon, 2018. "Strategic Formulary Design in Medicare Part D Plans," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 154-192, August.
    8. Martin Andersen, 2017. "Constraints on Formulary Design Under the Affordable Care Act," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(12), pages 160-178, December.
    9. Jonathan Gruber, 2017. "Delivering Public Health Insurance through Private Plan Choice in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 3-22, Fall.
    10. Francesco Decarolis & Andrea Guglielmo & Clavin Luscombe, 2020. "Open enrollment periods and plan choices," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 733-747, July.
    11. Braverman, Mark & Chassang, Sylvain, 2022. "Data-driven incentive alignment in capitation schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    12. Fang, H., 2016. "Insurance Markets for the Elderly," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 237-309, Elsevier.
    13. Mark Braverman & Sylvain Chassang, 2020. "Data-Driven Incentive Alignment in Capitation Schemes," Working Papers 2020-60, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    14. Troy Quast, 2019. "Emergency Department Visits by and Hospitalizations of Senior Diabetics in the Three Years Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 151-160, July.

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