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Bankruptcy, Warrants, and State-Contingent Changes in the Ownership of Control

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  • Kalay, Avner
  • Zender, Jaime F.
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

    Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 347-379

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:6:y:1997:i:4:p:347-379

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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    1. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    2. Berkovitch, Elazar & Israel, Ronen & Zender, Jaime F., 1997. "Optimal bankruptcy law and firm-specific investments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 487-497, April.
    3. Paul Asquith & Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers," NBER Working Papers 3942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," NBER Working Papers 5907, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
    6. Kaplan, Steven N., 1989. "Campeau's acquisition of federated : Value destroyed or value added," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 191-212, December.
    7. Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, 1988. "Optimal Security Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 229-263.
    8. Giammarino, Ronald M, 1989. "The Resolution of Financial Distress," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 25-47.
    9. Brown, David T, 1989. "Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 109-23.
    10. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
    11. Chiesa, Gabriella, 1992. "Debt and warrants: Agency problems and mechanism design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 237-254, September.
    12. Kaplan, Steven N., 1994. "Campeau's acquisition of Federated : Post-bankruptcy results," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 123-136, February.
    13. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
    14. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    15. Daigle, Katherine H & Maloney, Michael T, 1994. "Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 157-92, April.
    16. Zender, Jaime F, 1991. " Optimal Financial Instruments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(5), pages 1645-63, December.
    17. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1989. "The design of securities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 255-287.
    18. Arnoud W A Boot & Anjan V Thakor, 1992. "Security Design," CEPR Financial Markets Paper, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ 0020, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
    19. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    20. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    21. Israel, Ronen, 1992. "Capital and Ownership Structures, and the Market for Corporate Control," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 181-98.
    22. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. "The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 217-254.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kalay, Avner & Singhal, Rajeev & Tashjian, Elizabeth, 2007. "Is Chapter 11 costly?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 772-796, June.
    2. Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 2001. "Lender Liability and Large Investors," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 108-137, April.
    3. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability," Working Papers 00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Fulghieri, Paolo & Lukin, Dmitry, 2001. "Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-42, July.
    5. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1999. "Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

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