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Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk

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  • Caglio, Cecilia
  • Darst, R. Matthew
  • Parolin, Eric

Abstract

We construct a novel dataset that matches bank holding company credit default swap (CDS) positions to detailed U.S. credit registry data containing both loan and corporate bond holdings by large U.S. banks. The dataset sheds new light on how banks use CDS, and what effects, if any, CDS use has on corporate credit risk. We show that few banks insure loans, even loans of distressed borrowers, suggesting that empty creditor problems among banks are not widespread. We find that banks are more likely to sell than buy CDS when they have a lending relationship with CDS firms. We then create new aggregate measures of hedging activity based on position-level data to test the empty creditor hypothesis. Contrary to existing studies, aggregate measures of credit risk hedging that do not condition on lending relationships overstate bank hedging activity. Furthermore, our regression results do not find any evidence that firm credit risk is adversely impacted when banks in particular purchase CDS.

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  • Caglio, Cecilia & Darst, R. Matthew & Parolin, Eric, 2019. "Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:40:y:2019:i:c:s1042957319300142
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2019.03.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Czech, Robert, 2021. "Credit default swaps and corporate bond trading," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    2. Maximilian Jager & Frederick Zadow, 2023. "Clear(ed) Decision: The Effect of Central Clearing on Firms Financing Decision," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_445, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Söhnke M Bartram & Jennifer Conrad & Jongsub Lee & Marti G Subrahmanyam, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2464-2524.
    4. Hans Degryse & Yalin Gündüz & Kuchulain O'Flynn & Steven Ongena, 2020. "Identifying Empty Creditors with a Shock and Micro-Data," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-15, Swiss Finance Institute.
    5. Benbouzid, Nadia & Kumar, Abhishek & Mallick, Sushanta K. & Sousa, Ricardo M. & Stojanovic, Aleksandar, 2022. "Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    6. Hao, Xiangchao & Sun, Qinru & Xie, Fang, 2022. "International evidence for the substitution effect of FX derivatives usage on bank capital buffer," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    7. R. Matthew Darst & Ehraz Refayet, 2018. "Credit Default Swaps in General Equilibrium: Endogenous Default and Credit‐Spread Spillovers," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(8), pages 1901-1933, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk management; Bank lending; Credit risk; Credit default swaps;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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