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Information asymmetry and firms' credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

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  • Tang, Tony T.
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    Abstract

    I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms' credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms' ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms' real outcomes.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 93 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 325-351

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:93:y:2009:i:2:p:325-351

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    Keywords: Information asymmetry Capital structure Financing decisions Investment policies Credit ratings;

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    Cited by:
    1. Milidonis, Andreas, 2013. "Compensation incentives of credit rating agencies and predictability of changes in bond ratings and financial strength ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3716-3732.
    2. Shen, Carl Hsin-han, 2014. "Pecking order, access to public debt market, and information asymmetry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 291-306.
    3. Ting-Kai Chou, 2013. "Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 217-250, February.
    4. Gwion Williams & Rasha Alsakka & Owain ap Gwilym, 2013. "The Impact of Sovereign Credit Signals on Bank Share Prices during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers 13007, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    5. Oesch, David & Schuette, Dustin & Walter, Ingo, . "Real Effects of Investment Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Financial Crisis," Working Papers on Finance 1405, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    6. Seung Han & William Moore & Yoon Shin & Seongbaek Yi, 2013. "Unsolicited Versus Solicited: Credit Ratings and Bond Yields," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 293-319, June.
    7. Shibata, Takashi & Tian, Yuan, 2012. "Debt reorganization strategies with complete verification under information asymmetry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 141-160.
    8. Luciana De Souza & João De Mendonça Mergulhã, 2014. "Dívidas Corporativas Brasieliras: Emitir No Mercado Interno Ou No Externo?," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41th Brazilian Economics Meeting], ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Gra 140, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. Jiang, John (Xuefeng) & Harris Stanford, Mary & Xie, Yuan, 2012. "Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 607-621.
    10. Chou, Ting-Kai & Cheng, Jia-Chi, 2012. "Credit ratings and excess value of diversification," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 266-281.

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