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Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover

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Author Info
Agrawal, Anup
Knoeber, Charles R.
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-3SX82RY-B/2/c7c9b514913065b1877b9ebe7c8db7e8
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 219-239
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:47:y:1998:i:2:p:219-239

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  1. Patrick Bolton & Marco Becht & Alisa Roell, 2002. "Corporate Governance and Control," NBER Working Papers 9371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Yermack, David, 2006. "Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs," SIFR Research Report Series 41, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hiroshi Osano, 2001. "Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition," Working Papers 01-10, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eric Nowak & Michael H. Haid, 1999. "Executive compensation and the susceptibility of firms to hostile takeovers. An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil industry," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 32, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  5. Habib, Michel Antoine & Ljungqvist, Alexander P, 2000. "Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 2564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1106, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Filippo Ippolito, 2005. "Takeover Defenses, Firm-Specific Skills and Managerial Entrenchment," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe13, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Chongwoo Choe, 2001. "Optimal Executive Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Discussion Paper Series a419, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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