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Two-tier and negotiated tender offers: The imprisonment of the free-riding shareholder

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  • Comment, Robert
  • Jarrell, Gregg A.
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 19 (1987)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 283-310

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:19:y:1987:i:2:p:283-310

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    Cited by:
    1. Bates, Thomas W. & Lemmon, Michael L., 2003. "Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 469-504, September.
    2. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Utz Weitzel, 2005. "Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions," Working Papers 05-32, Utrecht School of Economics.
    3. Cakici, Nusret & Hessel, Chris & Tandon, Kishore, 1996. "Foreign acquisitions in the United States: Effect on shareholder wealth of foreign acquiring firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 307-329, March.
    4. Sanjai Bhagat & Ming Dong & David A. Hirshleifer & Robert B. Noah, 2004. "Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and Evidence," Finance 0412011, EconWPA.
    5. Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, 1993. "Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures," NBER Working Papers 4316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. S. Rosenkranz & G.U. Weitzel, 2007. "Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees," Working Papers 07-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    7. Corhay, Albert & Rad, Alireza Tourani, 2000. "International acquisitions and shareholder wealth Evidence from the Netherlands," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 163-174.
    8. Goldman, Eitan & Qian, Jun, 2005. "Optimal toeholds in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 321-346, August.
    9. Guo, Enyang & Keown, Arthur J. & Sen, Nilanjan, 1995. "An explanation of bidder returns in corporate acquisitions: the case of Japanese acquisitions of U.S. firms," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 145-154, July.
    10. Burns, Natasha & Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2007. "Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 1003-1031, April.

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