Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling Games
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 77 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven A. Matthews & Leonard J. Mirman, 1981.
"Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand,"
494, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthews, Steven A & Mirman, Leonard J, 1983. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 981-96, July.
- Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-96, September.
- Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
- Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-65, November.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, .
"On the strategic stability of equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Thomas D. Jeitschko & Hans-Theo Normann, 2009.
"Signaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
09/12, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 39-55.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2011. "Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings," DICE Discussion Papers 35, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Carlsson, Hans, 1997.
"Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games,"
Working Paper Series
485, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Christian Ewerhart & Philipp Wichardt, . "Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion," IEW - Working Papers 189, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Sibert, Anne, 2002.
"Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
- Sibert, Anne, 2001. "Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.