A Simple Model of Expert and Non-Expert Bidding in First-Price Auctions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 70 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006.
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- Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2003. "Unraveling in first-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 312-321, May.
- Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
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