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On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal

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Author Info
Jost, Peter-Jurgen
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45NJNMG-1K/2/301cde4ea32f6e9e869c1940c3be9f3b
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 68 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 510-530
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:2:p:510-530

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Anna Maria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2006. "Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1216-1216. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sarah Brown & Gaia Garino & Karl Taylor, 2005. "Mortgages and Financial Expectations: A Household Level Analysis," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/9, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Verena Hahn, 2000. "Antitrust Enforcement: Abuse Control or Notification?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 69-91, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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