Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 37 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Shmuel Nitzan, 2009.
"Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion',"
2009-18, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
- Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
- Storcken,Ton, 1995. "Strategy-proof preference rules," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Christian Roessler, 2006. "Public Good Menus and Feature Complementarity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 962, The University of Melbourne.
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