Manipulation and the Pareto rule
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 21 (1979)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December.
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