A problem with public sector preferences
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 14 (1977)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Milyo, Jeffrey, 2000.
"A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics,"
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 179-182, February.
- Jeffrey Milyo, 1999. "A Problem with Euclidean Preferences in Spatial Models of Politics," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9920, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
- Perry Shapiro & Jon Sonstelie, 1982. "Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 113-142, January.
- Kenneth Shepsle, 1986. "The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 135-178, January.
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