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Retained earnings dynamic, internal promotions and Walrasian equilibrium

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Author Info
Beker, Pablo F.

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Abstract

In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm's job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If firms maximize the discounted sum of its assets, financing expenditure out of retained earnings, profits are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts. Ex ante identical firms may follow different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry-wage in firms expected to grow more. In the steady state, however, workers performing the same job, in ex ante identical firms, receive the same wage. I explain when the long run outcome is efficient, when it is not, and why firms that produce inefficiently might drive the efficient ones out of the market even when the steady state has many of the positive properties of a Walrasian equilibrium. To some extent, it is not technological efficiency but workers' self-fulfilling expectations about their prospects for advancement within the firm that explains which firms have lower unit costs, grow more, and dominate the market.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 139 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 114-156
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:114-156

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Winter, Sidney G, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 85(2), pages 237-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 1635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Feldman, Mark & Gilles, Christian, 1985. "An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 26-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pablo F. Beker, 2004. "Retained Earnings Dynamic, Internal Promotions And Walrasian Equilibrium," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. David Scoones & Dan Bernhardt, 1991. "Promotion, Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers," Working Papers 817, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  7. Beker, Pablo F., 2004. "Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 329-344, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David, 2002. "Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 95-135, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Beker, Pablo F, 2007. "Retained Earnings Dynamic, Internal Promotions and Walrasian Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 813, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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